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A B S T R A C T
The actions of individuals are recognised as crucial in reducing energy demand and shifting people towards
sustainable energy sources. Much of the work that has occurred within environmental psychology has been built
upon a social cognitive paradigm, which attempts to explain the drives, forces and processes that explain and
determine individual behaviour. Despite the volume of this work, the promotion of pro-environmental behaviour
has not achieved broad transformations in energy conservation behaviours. Recently, researchers working in the
ﬁeld of pro-environmental research have started to draw on narrative in their work as a framework to (re)
integrate individuals into their historical, social and cultural settings. However, this work, when applied to
energy conservation, remains in its infancy. This paper adds to the growing literature that is increasingly as-
serting the key role for narrative in the ﬁeld of pro-environmental psychology research. The paper articulates the
foundations of the narrative turn from its development within literary theory to its adoption by the social
sciences, with particular reference to psychological theory. This paper provides a review of the ways in which
taking a narrative perspective can oﬀer rich insights into complex phenomena, as well as potential ways to
reconceptualise ways forward for energy research.
1. Introduction
The need to curtail carbon-intensive behaviours in order to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and address the complex challenges posed by
climate change is now well established at international, national and,
increasingly, local levels. Although infrastructure can be updated,
public policies drafted and new technologies deployed, these often fail
to realise optimal energy reductions owing to the complex array of
human factors and social practices involved [e.g. 1]. As such, addres-
sing the unsustainable use of energy by individuals (better known as
achieving behaviour change) has become a key area of focus for both
policy-makers and researchers. The ﬁeld of pro-environmental psy-
chology, a discrete area of the broader domain of environmental psy-
chology, has a long history of exploring and articulating the drivers,
processes and motivations involved in shifting people’s behaviour, in
varying contexts, to being more environmentally sustainable [2]. A
signiﬁcant amount of pioneering work in this area can be traced back to
the 1970s, largely as a reaction to the fears over energy security at the
time [2]. However, in the last couple of decades research in this area
has grown, as have the areas of applied focus. Work within pro-en-
vironmental psychology has explored a number of discrete areas in-
cluding attitudinal change [e.g. 3,4], habitual change [e.g. 5], social
norms [6][e.g. 6], feedback and goal setting [e.g. 7,8] and so on.
Despite the longevity of this work, it can be argued that the successes of
these activities have not been realised and applied on a wide scale, with
notable exceptions such as the use of social norming in hotel towel use
[9] and the work on social comparisons that underpins the work of
Opower in the United States.
Part of the reason for the limited societal impact of many pro-en-
vironmental psychology studies may be the inherent individualism
within many of these works. Such works have tended to focus on mental
processes, attitudes and decision-making without suﬃcient reference to
an individual’s place in wider society, as Brown [10] has asserted:
“We all strive to ﬁt in with our peers and follow the many complex
and hidden rules of behaving in the society in which we live. This is
why harnessing the power of others (and more speciﬁcally our de-
sire to be like others) is so important for energy eﬃciency”
Many of the models and theories within pro-environmental psy-
chology developed predominantly within the United States at a time
when there was a huge increase in the number of studies embedded
within social psychology, which was, at the time, dominated by social
cognition. Such an approach channels Cartesian thinking, which dom-
inates Western models of psychology and seeks to measure, record and
explain [see 11], treating the person as a processor of information. At
the centre of theories within the social cognitive paradigm is the belief
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that there is a core essential self that has an objective and universal
reality, with cultural, historical and social factors enabling the ‘display’
of this self but not taken to be inextricably interwoven with it [12].
Largely owing to the dominance of these approaches, Gough and
McFadden [13] argue that individuals in Western societies have be-
come used to thinking about themselves as in possession of some unique
‘core’ personality, ultimately quantiﬁable and known as either one
thing or another. Such identiﬁcation appears to help to predict what
individuals would do in certain situations and what tasks or situations
are unsuitable or incompatible for such individuals. The self, conceived
from this position, provides conditions that remain constant throughout
situations, making no allowances for important social or cultural in-
ﬂuences [13].
The notion and assertion of the self as a core and essential entity
have been at the centre of a debate across a number of disciplines over
the years. Goﬀman [14] argues that the self, or rather the presentation
of the self, is a managed performance that is tailored to certain situa-
tions in order to fulﬁl certain societal and cultural norms and obliga-
tions. Rather than a self that is stable across situations and time, writers
such as Goﬀman [14] posit a self that is “…ﬂexible and dynamic,
adopting and discarding ‘multiple roles’ as the situation demands – a
fragmented rather than a unitary self” [13]. Similarly, Burkitt asserts
that “…human individuals, embodied persons become identiﬁed within
the multiple relations in which they are located and which, as agents,
they change through their mutual interactions” [15]. Writers such as
Goldstein and Rayner reject the existence of a ‘core’, stable and ‘es-
sential’ self and assert that the self “has no permanent essence but
continuously reinvents itself” [16].
Thus, researchers and writers within psychology have had to look to
other disciplines within the social sciences such as sociology, anthro-
pology and philosophy in order to attempt to contextualise the human
self. One of the areas psychology has drawn upon and applied across a
whole range of research areas is narrative. Although in recent years
such ideas have been increasingly explored in the context of climate
change adaptability and policy development [17–19], the application of
narrative within pro-environmental psychology remains in its infancy.
This essay reviews the development of narrative approaches within
psychology and applies this to the growing literature base that re-
cognises the key role narrative can play in supporting pro-environ-
mental research and, more speciﬁcally, in understanding the behaviour
of people. The essay is structured in three parts. Sections 1 and 2 ar-
ticulate the foundations of what is known as the ‘narrative turn’ from its
development to its adoption within psychology. Following this, Sections
3 and 4 outline the functions a narrative approach has. Section 5 looks
at how narrative is accommodated within the research process, before
the essay is concluded in Section 6. The literature on narrative is ex-
tensive and it is not the intention of this essay to review all permuta-
tions of narrative theory. Instead, the essay is focused on delineating
the limitations of the empiricist approach to social cognition, which
underpins much of pro-environmental psychological theory, and ad-
vocating the beneﬁts approaches grounded in narrative can have for
understanding complex reasoning and behaviours.
2. The adoption of narrative within psychology
Narrative approaches have been applied diversely through a vast
number of distinct ﬁelds. These include history [20–22], philosophy
[23], sociology [24,25], anthropology [26], education [27,28], social
work [29,30] and psychology [31–33]. However, the foundations of the
broad area that is now referred to as the narrative approach in psy-
chology have their roots mainly in writings within literary theory [34].
A considerable body of work now exists in relation to policy-making
and policy analysis [35,36][see,for example,35,36], with an ever-in-
creasing proportion of this work looking at climate change or en-
vironmental research [17,19]. The turn to narrative ways of under-
standing human action and experience has its theoretical place within
what has generally been termed ‘the interpretative turn’ in the social
sciences [37,38].
When adopted by psychology, the interpretative turn was a way in
which certain writers such as Bruner [32] intended to ‘return’ to a
theoretical position of understanding individual psychology that had
been seen to be overwhelmingly dominated by mechanistic metaphors
[39] and the normative ‘cognitive revolution’ [32]. According to
Bruner, the cognitive revolution, which developed from the 1950s
alongside the evolution of the information communication technolo-
gies, was an attempt to understand human actions and psychological
processes as being analogous to those of a computer, using as its base a
computational information-processing metaphor to explore how in-
dividuals make sense of their world [32]. Similarly, Sarbin argues that
the dominant worldview in modern Western civilisation relies on the
‘root metaphor’ of mechanism [39]. He argues that by drawing on such
a metaphor we come to understand and explain our lives in terms of
‘drives’ and ‘forces’ that determine the causes of behaviour that un-
derpin human experience. Such mechanistic and computational ap-
proaches are empiricist approaches, and, as Milnes outlines, these:
“…rely heavily upon the realist assumption that individuals, cul-
tures and events exist independently of our perception and inter-
pretation of them and can therefore be studied ‘objectively’ using
methods of inquiry originally developed to aid in the study of ob-
jects and forces in the natural and physical world” [40]
Although such empirical positivist approaches are arguably, as
Sarbin claims, the dominant viewpoints in psychology [39], numerous
arguments highlight their possible limitations and, in turn, outline the
contribution that alternative interpretative approaches, such as narra-
tive, can make. Indeed, Bruner outlines how William Wundt, who
heralded the idea of the psychological laboratory, commented in his
later life how:
“…constricting the new ‘laboratory’ style could be, and in for-
mulating a new ‘cultural psychology’ urged that we embrace a more
historical, interpretive approach to understanding man’s cultural
products” [32]
Bruner argues that human beings understand their world in two
distinct ways, deﬁned as the ‘paradigmatic mode’ of thought and the
‘narrative mode’ of thought [32]. The paradigmatic mode of thought is
exempliﬁed by scientists and logicians, who seek to determine cause-
and-eﬀect relationships and develop tightly reasoned analyses, logical
proofs and empirical observations. In this model, Bruner proposes that
human beings attempt to understand the world by establishing and
maintaining unambiguous objective truths [32]. In this way, hy-
potheses and theories can be tested and demonstrated to be proved or
disproved. The ‘paradigmatic mode’ of thought, however, “…is not able
to make much sense of human desire, goals, and social conduct” [41].
In contrast to scientiﬁc logical reasoning, McAdams proposes that
human events are often ambiguous and cannot be reduced to such
tightly reasoned analysis devoid of rich contextual landscapes, as
human stories describe their experiences in words that often “…mean
more than they can say” [41]. Bruner sees the narrative mode of
thought as enabling the organisation of everyday interpretations of
experiences, events, places, people etc. in story form. The challenge for
contemporary psychology, according to Bruner, is to understand this
‘everyday’ form of thinking [32].
In understanding human experience in the social sciences, utilising
narratives did not entail an immediate turn away from empiricism, such
as those approaches characterised by classic laboratory research.
Instead, there was a gradual movement in the kinds of approaches used
within the social sciences in order to qualitatively explore individual
and social experience [38]. The utilisation of narrative within qualita-
tive social science research can be traced back to the works of the
Chicago School [42,43]. However, stories and narratives in these eth-
nographic approaches were still ﬁrmly entrenched within a realist
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paradigm, which aimed to document realistic descriptions of events
occurring in urban life [38]. Such descriptions were intended to draw
the readers’ attention towards what was ‘really’ happening in such si-
tuations and environments. Rather than the constructionist tenet of
narrative theory, which holds that language is a tool used to produce
meaning, not simply a means of expressing ‘real’ experience [44],
language was merely a medium for telling the readers what was more or
less an objective truth. As such, language was seen as transparent,
which reﬂected “…stable, singular meanings” [38]. Riessman goes on
to claim that those like herself who engage in critique with the realist
position present a challenge to these views of language and knowledge
as transparent and ‘real’, a position forming the philosophical under-
pinnings of ‘narrative knowing’ [45] in the social sciences:
“Sceptical about a correspondence theory of truth, language is un-
derstood as deeply constitutive of reality, not simply a technical
device for establishing meaning. Informants’ stories do not mirror a
world ‘out there’. They are constructed, creatively authored, rheto-
rical, replete with assumptions, and interpretive” [38]
Clandinin and Connelly oﬀer the term ‘narrative inquiry’ to en-
capsulate the approaches taken within the human and social sciences
that explore diﬀerent levels of narrativity between individuals and
within societies and cultures [28]. In the main, much of the develop-
ment of narrative inquiry in the social sciences has occurred within
sociology [38] and anthropology [46]. In comparison with these dis-
ciplines, the use of narrative inquiry within psychology remains less
developed although this is now increasing and can be found to varying
degrees in clinical psychology, counselling psychology and psy-
chotherapy, where there is a strong tradition of using narrative in
therapy settings [47–49]. Similarly, writers within health psychology
have utilised a narrative framework in exploring how people experience
illness and ill health and how they make sense of their lives through the
stories they tell [50,51]. The use of narrative in work allied to en-
vironmental psychology is increasing and has often been undertaken in
combination with practice theory derived from sociology [52,53].
Taking a historical perspective, the development of narrative
methods within psychology can be seen to stem broadly from two po-
sitions, namely, humanistic approaches [54,55] and what Bruner refers
to as the “cognitive revolution” [32]. Crossley states that humanistic
approaches are characterised by their use of qualitative methods, in-
terest in the depth of human experience, and emphasis on “…‘experi-
ence and experiencing’, ‘uniqueness’, ‘meaning’, ‘freedom’ and ‘choice”'
[33]. Crossley argues that humanism retains elements of realist
thinking. Although humanistic approaches acknowledge the existence
of an autonomous self capable of making informed choices, that self is
presented as ‘stable’ and ‘knowable’ independently of language and
context [33]. Bruner describes the cognitive revolution as “intended to
bring ‘mind’ back into the human sciences after a long cold winter of
objectivism” [32]. According to Bruner, the attraction of information
technologies for psychology resulted in a ‘dehumanised’ discipline,
where information processing became the “model of the mind” [32]
and ‘processes’ within ‘virtual minds’ in computers and ‘real’ minds
could be seen as synonymous and understood in the same way. In the
mid-1970s, the move from these positivistic approaches to the inter-
pretative philosophies and works of social scientists such as Geertz
[26,46] and Rabinow and Sullivan [56] sowed the seeds of the inter-
pretative approach we see today. The interpretative movement was
characterised by a renewed interest in meaning and the recognition that
human beings have the ability to reﬂect on their experiences and the
world around them. In this way, culture and cultural practices came to
be reframed as texts [46]. Riessman suggests that it was this movement
towards qualitative and discursive approaches that, approximately a
decade later, and somewhat behind most of the social sciences, brought
about a further shift in the ﬁeld of psychology, which became known as
the narrative turn [38].
3. The narrative turn in psychology
The deﬁnition of what constitutes narrative is something that
widely engages researchers and writers within the areas of narrative
inquiry and narrative philosophy. However, Barthes provides a com-
prehensive outline:
“The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is ﬁrst and
foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed
amongst diﬀerent substances – as though any material were ﬁt to
receive man’s stories. Able to be carried by articulated language,
spoken or written, ﬁxed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered
mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in myth, legend,
fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime,
painting…stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news item, con-
versation. Moreover under this almost inﬁnite diversity of forms,
narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society; it
begins with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor
has been a people without narrative. All classes, all human groups,
have their narratives…caring nothing for the division between good
and bad literature, narrative is international, transhistorical, trans-
cultural; it is simply there, like life itself” [57]
Research within the narrative turn can encompass a diverse range of
approaches, including, for example, autobiography, autoethnography,
biography, personal narrative, life history, oral history, memoir and
literary journalism. The role of language within narrative approaches
varies depending upon the epistemological position of the researcher or
research environment, with theoretical positions tending to be located
somewhere on a constructionist–cognitive continuum. Similarly, re-
searchers and writers in psychology vary in the extent to which they see
narratives as either located in the minds of individuals (i.e. the con-
structivist paradigm), such as Schank and Abelson [58,59], or created
in discursive practices (i.e. the constructionist paradigm), for example,
Potter and Wetherell [60]. Milnes identiﬁes the diﬀerence inherent in
the way in which narrative is conceptualised and suggests that:
“…“strong” cognitive approaches and ‘strong’ social constructionist/
discursive approaches are however, probably best seen as two ends
of a continuum (rather than a strict dichotomy) with many narrative
researchers positioning themselves somewhere between the two”
[40]
Regardless of the epistemological positioning of narrative in psy-
chology, the fundamental commonality remains that those working
within narrative inquiry agree that narrative is pervasive in human life.
However, Sarbin holds that the term narrative can be seen to be sy-
nonymous with the more familiar term story [39], a position also held
by Polkinghorne [45]. After excluding “sensory physiology”, Sarbin
claims that all psychology is grounded in narrative [39] and that “the
essence of human thought can be found in the stories we use to inform
and indoctrinate ourselves as to the nature of reality” [61]. Mair [47]
supports Sarbin’s [39] assertion and says:
“Stories are habitations. We live in and through stories. They con-
jure worlds. We do not know the world other than as story world.
Stories inform life. They hold us together and keep us apart. We
inhabit the great stories of our culture. We live through stories. We
are lived by the stories of our race and place. It is the enveloping and
constituting function of stories that is especially important to sense
more fully. We are, each of us, locations where the stories of our
place and time become partially tellable” [47]
Others prefer to see stories as just one sub-class of narrative, such as
de Beaugrande and Colby [62] and Brewer [63]. However, it is the
production of a story, which is both temporal and logical, that is argued
to be a method of sense-making for the individual [38,39,64]:
“A story is a symbolised account of actions of human beings that has
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a temporal dimension. The story has a beginning, middle and an
ending [or as Kermode (1967) suggests, the sense of an ending]. The
story is held together by recognisable patterns of events called plots.
Central to the plot structure are human predicaments and attempted
resolutions” [39]
What constitutes a ‘story’ has in itself engaged many researchers.
Deﬁnitions have ranged widely and include those given by Polanyi,
who proposes that a story must relate to an event in past time and that a
story must have a point [65]. Bruner proposes ﬁve vital components for
a story to be seen as such, which comprise an actor, an action, a goal, a
scene and an ‘instrumentality’ [31]. However, according to Bruner, a
good story contains a sixth component, that of ‘trouble’, as a story worth
telling rests on the tension and imbalance that lies between these
components [31]. Other researchers have focused upon the gramma-
tical structure of a story, and certain writers [66–68] have become
known for their structural concerns with narratives.
According to Burck, a great deal of attention has been focused upon
the identiﬁcation of “dominant societal discourses” or the “social or-
ganisation of talk” and what this talk enables to be experienced, ac-
knowledged or ignored [44]. In particular, in narrative theory Man-
kowski and Rappaport developed the notion of the dominant cultural
narrative [69]. Dominant cultural narratives are stories about persons,
places or things that have consistent storylines and thematic content
across individuals and settings and are transmitted through images in
the media and conversation. These dominant cultural narratives are “…
thought to reﬂect societal views about particular people, places, or
things” [70]. As such, it is generally considered that “identities cannot
be picked up and lived at will” [44]. Rather, our positions within the
cultural stories available are said to shape the personal stories that we
develop about our lives and experience [44]. Thus, people live within
“storied landscapes” [28], and narrative theory contends that this al-
lows knowledge to be transported and ways of knowing to be con-
stituted [17]. Paschen and Ison apply this concept to climate adaptation
by linking the notion of cultural narratives to the development of per-
sonal stories as a way in which groups of people understand their past
as a determinant of possible future action [17].
4. Narrative as an ‘organising principle’ for human life
Kirmayer argues that narratives of the self serve a variety of func-
tions:
“They order the inner world of the self, creating a sense of coherence
and point of view from which to describe and reason about the
world. Narratives of the self also serve rhetorical purposes, pro-
viding us with a story or biography that constitutes our social per-
sonhood as something meaningful to and valued by others” [71]
Kirmayer goes on to suggest that these narratives are drawn from
“cultural schemas”, where personal narratives serve to explain personal
transformations and experiences “strung along a temporal trajectory
structured by causal theories, fate and happenstance” [71]. In contrast
to a literary narrative, however, personal narratives are often un-
ﬁnished, allowing the individual story-maker to anticipate their future.
As a result, depending upon how the individual has structured their
story, this can lead to a future narrative arc that could frame future
events, for instance, as hope or despair [71]. It is at this intersection
with ideas of transition and change that researchers exploring pro-en-
vironmental and energy practices have begun to argue for the value of
adopting narrative approaches [52,53]. These are periods rich with
complexity, and people strive to make decisions and behave in ways
that remain in keeping with their personal script. In the context of
energy, such transitions occur upon a move to a new dwelling, the in-
stallation of a new heating system, engagement with new metering
technology, or a change in the price of energy. These events provide
unique opportunities to engage with people to explore how the
decisions they are making are being made and how they are making
sense of these transitions. McLeod asserts that one of the central func-
tions of a story is that it oﬀers ‘guidelines’, ‘a script’, or ways that one
should behave in certain situations [49]. It serves to convey a sense of
moral order, as stories indicate what was right or wrong in a given
situation. McLeod oﬀers the example of the religious story of the Good
Samaritan, which instructs the listener/reader how to behave when
someone is in need [49]. Such parables are told in order to make a
particular religious, ethical or moral point. Similarly, McAdams claims
that conceptualisation of a personal myth provides each person with an
identity that “[illuminates] the values of an individual life…a sacred
story that embodies personal truth” [41]. Here, an individual has a
template by which they perform their lives and act according to their
personal truths. Kirmayer argues that our stories are “containers and
conveyors of moral truth” [71], which entail a complex system of ethics
and moral application. Similarly, Coﬀey and Atkinson [72] agree with
Czarniawska [73] and Gabriel [74] that stories and legends are often
told in a variety of settings in order to demonstrate what not to do and
detail possible consequences if mistakes are made or rules are not fol-
lowed. McLeod, however, is keen to reinstate the notion of interpreta-
tion in his use of ‘scripts’ to elucidate what he understands as narrative.
He says that these narratives are not literal scripts that determine ev-
erything that an individual will do. Rather, the scripts serve as guides
that can be assimilated with the individual’s own point of view [49]. In
the context of energy such scripts can also be developed by community
groups or communities of practice that one identiﬁes with. From this
viewpoint, membership of local communities that directly or indirectly
‘champion’ energy eﬃciency can contribute to increasing energy eﬃ-
ciency by oﬀering an alternative script for their members. This scripting
thus goes beyond a more unidimensional concept of social norms.
According to Murray, the prime function of narrative is its ability to
bring order to disorder. In doing so, individuals provide themselves
with an opportunity to produce a coherent account of their lives [75].
By organising the events, people, places and happenings in their lives,
people are able to make sense of a world that Ricoeur asserts is con-
stantly in ﬂux [76]. In order to explain how people make sense of their
world, Sarbin proposes what he calls the “narratory principle” [39].
This is the idea that human beings “think, perceive, imagine, interact
and make moral choices according to narrative structures” [33]. Sarbin
argues that when a number of pictures or descriptive phrases are pre-
sented to a person, they ‘automatically’ begin to construct a story that
renders the unconnected images or phrases meaningful in some way,
thus attempting to bring coherence to their world [39]. According to
Becker, the use of narrative is particularly pronounced when people try
to make sense of ‘chaotic’ events and disruptions to routine such as
personal problems, ﬁnancial problems, health problems and environ-
mental challenges [77]. Converting these events into a story provides a
means by which order can be restored [75]. Integral to the work that
those involved in what Riessman calls the “life story tradition” [38] is
the focus upon the way that narratives enable human beings to organise
their experience into a coherent whole, and the primary focus is
therefore on the concepts of plot, temporality, sequentiality and con-
nectivity.
Sarbin argues that the role plot plays in narrative structure is vital
[39], with researchers such as Polkinghorne focusing their interest
upon the way in which ‘emplotted’ episodes are held together and given
meaning by the use of time and sequence [45]. Attempts have been
made to try to identify and classify the genres of plots that are used in
making sense of events and experience. For example, White suggests
four major plot structures: tragedy, romance, comedy and satire [78].
McAdams saw certain plotlines that occurred repeatedly in the life
stories in his research, such as creating order from chaos, ﬁghting a
battle, taking a journey and enduring suﬀering [79]. Similarly, Frank
suggests a number of narrative structures that appear in accounts of
health and illness, such as narratives of restitution, chaos and quest
[51]. As an example, Janda and Topouzi draw on the notion of the
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quest plot to outline its applicability within the context of the devel-
opment of energy policy [19]. According to Crossley, rather than an
individual being portrayed as a passive information processor, the
narrative principle invokes a more humanistic notion of the self,
whereby an individual becomes active in their construction of their
world by being a teller of their stories, which contain heroes and vil-
lains, plots and images of actors within the story engaged in active
dialogue [33]. Sarbin therefore claims that engaging with the notion of
the narrative principle not only helps us to understand our past, it also
allows us to grasp our present and anticipate our future [39].
Writers within a more constructionist tradition may question the
assertion made by McAdams that “Human beings are storytellers by
nature” [41]. Narrative and story appear proliﬁcally in human life to
greater or lesser extents depending upon the cultural milieu. Indeed,
Paschen and Ison have postulated that the very term narrative has be-
come popularised through the media and marketing, and in the context
of pro-environmental work it refers to how information is “…framed or
‘storied’, strategically in order to achieve broadest possible credence
across a variety of stakeholders” [17]. McAdams, however, goes on to
assert the historical endurance of storytelling from Stone Age humans
gathering around a campﬁre to modern-day humans understanding
their place in their world [41]. McAdams continues to explain that
stories are not simply ‘chronicles’ in the way that a ‘factual’ account of a
meeting would be if minuted. Rather:
“Stories are less about facts and more about meanings. In the sub-
jective and embellished telling of the past, the past is constructed –
history is made. History is judged to be true or false not solely with
respect to its adherence to empirical fact. Rather, it is judged with
respect to such narrative criteria as ‘believability’ and ‘coherence”’
[41]
Ricoeur emphasises the role that time plays in the way that human
beings organise their experience of the past [76]. According to Ricoeur,
an individual’s personal experience of history is composed of a series of
stories that culminate in an idea of time and temporality [76]. As
McAdams asserts:
“When we comprehend our actions over time, we see what we do in
terms of a story. We see obstacles confronted, and intentions rea-
lised and frustrated over time. As we move forward from yesterday
to today to tomorrow, we move through tensions building to cli-
maxes, climaxes giving way to denouements, and tensions building
again as we continue to move and change. Human time is a storied
aﬀair” [41]
It is therefore widely held that narratives serve to organise human
experience, and, as Sarbin and others [39,45,65,80] have claimed, a
narrative must have a beginning, a middle and an end. The sequencing
of narrative accounts has motivated some to suggest that narrative
accounts are sequenced chronologically [66], others claim that the-
matic sequencing occurs [81] and others have advocated a position
similar to cause and eﬀect termed consequential sequencing [82].
Polkinghorne also writes about how individuals organise their ex-
perience and argues that meaning is intertwined with both temporal
and sequential connections. What we are actually asking when we ask
what something means, Polkinghorne asserts, is “…‘how does it ﬁt into
the whole?’ or ‘what are its connections and relationships to other
concepts, events or experiences?’ ” [45]. These connections, relation-
ships or ‘meanings’ are not only individualistic; they are also rooted in
and transferred through cultures in the form of myths, fairy tales,
proverbs and stories and pictures in the media. Polkinghorne describes
the process by which individuals assemble individual events into a
whole as ‘narrative ordering’:
“The ordering process operates by linking diverse happenings along
a temporal dimension and by identifying the eﬀect that one event
has on another, and it serves to cohere human actions and the events
that aﬀect human life into a temporal gestalt. As there are a limited
number of gestalt operations that produce recognisable perceptual
conﬁgurations, so there are a limited number of narrative structures
that produce coherent stories” [45]
The need to be coherent in our lives and make sense of our ex-
periences in the form of a meaningful whole is seen by Kirmayer to
instigate dramatic changes in how we see and/or describe our lives:
“Everyday stories of the self are mutable and constantly shift as they
are told and retold in diﬀerent settings. They are re-written to re-
duce dissonance and to conform to our current situations, values,
goals and commitments. Major life events may lead us to rewrite
whole chapters of our autobiography to justify a particular course of
action or rationalise outcomes we never foresaw. Memories, in turn,
are shaped by these narratives” [71]
Encouragingly for those in the business of behaviour change,
Murray asserts that all narratives in life are provisional, as they are
subject to change as new information or a new interpretation becomes
available to people. “It is not that the narrator is trying to mislead the
listener but rather, from a more extended perspective, diﬀerent pieces
of information become available for the story” [75].
5. A critique of narrative coherence
In common with many theorists in the preceding section, Gergen
suggests that “Rather than see our life as simply ‘one damn thing after
another’, we formulate a story in which life events are systematically
related, rendered intelligible by their place in a sequence or unfolding
process” [83]. McLeod advises caution in assuming that narrative co-
herence is an achievable end point. He identiﬁes three assumptions
implicit within arguments that emphasise a coherent self: ﬁrstly, that
such a thing as a unitary self exists; secondly, that it is somehow de-
sirable to achieve a coherent sense of self; and ﬁnally, that the self is
bounded and autonomous [49]. Andrews, Sclater, Squire and Treacher
take a similar view on issues of coherence, asserting that “Narratives
come in many kinds: they are contradictory and fragmented: there is no
such thing as a coherent story” [84]. According to Murray, the need to
restore a sense of order in our lives is particularly pronounced in
Western society [75]. Western society, according to Becker, is domi-
nated by linearity and rationality, where we try to become consistent
and both see our actions and present ourselves as logical and reasonable
[77]. Although intertwined with a ‘Western’ perception of self, Mair
demonstrates that it is possible to reconceptualise individuals within
‘Western’ society as representing multiplicity and a multiple-storied self
or a “community of selves” [47]. In this sense, people in the context of
energy can be understood as being both energy-eﬃcient and ineﬃcient
with energy, in the same way as people are recognised as plurivocal or
polyphonic. Such a dialogical analysis explores identities from a poly-
phonic perspective, recognising contradictions and simultaneities and
the co-constructive nature of our identities. This approach makes sense
within the context of an “increasingly interconnected world society”
[85]. In this spirit, the principles of dialogism and the principles of
narrative intersect, as adopting an interpretation of the world through a
narrative lens “generates unique insights into the range of multiple,
intersecting forces that order and illuminate relations between self and
society” [86]. As Hermans and Kempen assert:
“The notion of ‘story’ or ‘narrative’ assumes the existence of a person
who tells and an actual or imaginal person who listens. The fact that
a listener, another person, is always present or implied, makes the
self a dialogical phenomenon par excellence. The view of the self as a
narrative does not only apply to Western culture, but also to other
cultures, as people of all times and places have told each other
stories about the world and themselves” [87].
For Bakhtin [88], each utterance contains at least two voices,
P. Brown Energy Research & Social Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
5
namely, the voice of the speaking person and the voice of the social
language through which it is ventriloquated:
“Words and discourse are socially charged, dialogically engaged
with past, present and future audiences, and populated by the in-
tentions of the unique speaker” [89].
It is this latter position that writers within dialogism emphasise.
Although the dialogically constituted subject is decentred [90,91], the
individual subject is not removed completely, as human creativity, re-
sponsibility and agency are given considerable prominence. It is the
process of authorship that is key in the development and production of
the self. The self, as a result, is no longer seen as a product of a single,
monotonic voice but rather is the result of the emergence of the in-
teractions that occur among authoritative and ‘internally persuasive’
discourses:
“Thus speaking and authoring a self can be a creative and novel
endeavour, an act that constructs personal and cultural meanings.
An author in her utterances also creates or assumes one or more
positions in a cultural or ﬁgured world. In weaving a narrative, the
speaker places herself, her listeners, and those who populate the
narrative in certain positions and relations that are ﬁgured by larger
cultural meanings or worlds. Narrative acts may reinforce or chal-
lenge these ﬁgured worlds” [89].
6. Using narrative in psychological research
As recognised by Paschen and Ison, narrative approaches are in-
clusive on a number of levels: socially, structurally and conceptually
[17]. At the centre of narrative approaches to data generation is co-
construction. Whereas researchers within a normative realist model of
environmental psychology would gather and collect data, narrative
researchers engage in a process of co-construction and mutual reﬂec-
tion about the phenomena being studied. According to the social con-
structionist tradition narrative researchers:
“…do not have direct access to another’s experience. We deal with
ambiguous representations of it – talk, text, interaction and inter-
pretation” [38].
Rejecting the notion of realism that there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’
that can be objectively studied, the social constructionist view sees the
world and the experiences associated with the world as interpretations.
Therefore, if we cannot have access to ‘direct’ experience we deal with a
person’s account of it. Consequently, narrative researchers are mindful
about issues such as voice and positionality. Narrative researchers re-
ﬂect critically on the process of research as much as on the topic under
study. The context within which the research takes place, the roles of
the researcher (listener) and researched (storyteller) and the inter-
pretation are all subjected to extensive critical reﬂection [92]. In broad
terms, the process of generating and analysing narrative research is
iterative. Riessman outlines ﬁve interconnected levels of engagement
with research ‘data’. These are subject to constant shifts, as at each level
a diﬀerent subjective interpretation is brought by the teller, the listener
and, ultimately, the reader. The ﬁrst level comprises attending to ex-
periences: these experiences are sensory experiences, experiences that
get the researcher’s attention as a backdrop to the area of study, ex-
periences that inﬂuence the following levels of representation. The
second level is seen as the ‘telling about experience’. This level is the
performance of a personal narrative, where the teller provides his or her
narrative account and includes and omits information depending upon
the function the narrative is serving. The third level is the transcribing
level, where a recorded conversation is given written text status.
However, it is claimed here that such written text can never be an
unproblematic transparent recording of the interview. The next level is
that of analysing experience. Here, the researcher explores signiﬁcant
parts of the teller’s account to analyse in adherence to the research aims
or epistemological position of the research project. The ﬁnal level of
representation, according to Riessman, is that of reading experience. At
this level, depending upon the ontological, epistemological and theo-
retical position of the reader, each text is open to an inﬁnite number of
interpretations [38]. As Rabinow and Sullivan assert, every text is
“plurivocal, open to several readings and to several constructions” [56].
Similarly, performatively speaking, if we take a dialogical perspective
[87,93] each text can be seen to contain multiple positionings as the
teller unfolds their narrative. This narrative may present a multivoiced
or polyphonic self in dialogue with voices both canonical and inter-
nalised, as well as dialogues between past selves and/or voices [94].
These interconnected levels of representation highlight how com-
plex the issue of truth is for narrative theorists. Narrative is grounded in
subjectivity and therefore truth is also subjective. The Personal
Narratives Group saw truths in this way:
“When talking about their lives, people lie sometimes, forget a lot,
exaggerate, become confused, and get things wrong. Yet they are
revealing truths. These truths don’t reveal the past ‘as it actually
was,’ aspiring to a standard of objectivity. They give us instead the
truths of our experiences...Unlike the Truth of the scientiﬁc ideal,
the truths of personal narratives are neither open to proof nor self-
evident. We come to understand them only through interpretation,
paying careful attention to the contexts that shape their creation and
to the world views that inform them. Sometimes the truths we see in
personal narratives jar us from our complacent security as inter-
preters ‘outside’ the story and make us aware that our own place in
the world plays a part in our interpretation and shapes the meanings
we derive from them” [95]
If, as Sarbin claims, “[T]he narrative allows for the inclusion of
actors’ reasons for their acts, as well as the causes of happening” [39],
each narrative, in the telling, is inextricably linked to sensory inﬂu-
ences, as well as the functions the narrative is expected to serve in the
telling.
7. Conclusion
This essay started by asserting that the work existing on the topic of
pro-environmental behaviours within environmental psychology has
not had the wide social impact needed to address the challenges arising
as a result of climate change. Whilst we know more about people’s
decision-making and attitudes and the factors that inﬂuence behaviours
as a result of the 40 years of work on pro-environmental behaviours,
there hasn’t been a subsequent change in the way in which people act in
relation to energy. The essay has argued that owing to the complexity
associated with climate change, energy use and sustainability, the use
of a normative social cognitive paradigm starts from a position that
removes people from their social and cultural context. A number of
researchers from across the social sciences have, in the last decade,
provided strong arguments for the value of adopting narrative ap-
proaches in understanding behavioural responses to climate change and
the need to embed energy eﬃciency into daily practices [17,19,53].
Such work has looked at how people make sense of their lives and how
energy policies can embed particular narratives within them in order to
evoke particular individual responses and understand community-level
approaches to environmental challenges. However, the move towards
narrative within pro-environmental psychology remains in its infancy.
In this essay I have sought to redress this balance by exploring the
development of what has become known as the ‘narrative turn’ in
psychology, in order to provide a canvas upon which further applica-
tions of narrative within pro-environmental psychological research can
build. The paper has reviewed ways in which various writers have
adopted the narrative metaphor in attempting to understand individual
and social understanding. As McAdams has argued, narratives are es-
sential to our human development and understanding:
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“We are tellers of tales. We each seek to provide our scattered and
often confusing experiences with a sense of coherence by arranging
the episodes of our lives into stories” [79]
Adopting the narrative metaphor within the context of energy re-
search can provide new tools for understanding the lives of people and,
by listening to their stories, new ways can be found to inﬂuence the
dominant cultural narratives via policies that are drawn upon to guide
how we perform our roles and act in a range of particular situations
[36]. Paschen and Ison provide a compelling description of their work
with communities on the topic of ﬂood resilience [17]. As many actions
within the domain of climate change adaptation or energy require
collective responses, an understanding of where a community stands on
particular issues, what steps they believe are necessary and, im-
portantly, their role in them is crucial. Similarly, Brown, Swan and
Chahal discuss this in relation to failures in the delivery of domestic
retroﬁt in the UK by drawing on the notion of rumour and how stories
of ‘shoddy workmanship’ are transmitted between neighbourhoods.
Such stories contribute to increasing alienation from the retroﬁt process
and breakdowns in trust in ‘experts’ and the advice being given [96].
As such, the author shares Plumwood’s argument of the need to
overcome “the ecological crisis of reason”, where decisions are made
seemingly on the basis of dominant technical-rational evidence that
appears to override emotional and experiential human–environment
dialogical relationships [97]. There are complexities in abundance in
everyday life. Where and how we live and work, our interfaces and
interactions with objects and technologies, the meanings we attribute to
temperature and our surroundings and our physiological responses all
interact to present us with challenges for personal coherence. Energy-
eﬃcient behaviours may not be transferable between diﬀerent contexts
(e.g. home and workplace), and ways of acting in one situation do not
necessarily determine that the same actions will occur in other similar
situations. As such, as well as a move away from the use of social
cognition to ‘explain’ behaviour, there may be a need to move away
from the concept of an integrated/monological self in which we are
characterised by unitariness to a process of understanding people that is
inherently dialogical. It may therefore become less surprising that
people are seemingly ‘irrational’ beings, as they are both ‘eﬃcient’ and
‘ineﬃcient’ in their use of energy. Rather than a monological narrative
view, which discounts the possibility that such equal and contradictory
views or, more appropriately, voices can be held simultaneously, such
interplay is expected and accepted. Such dialogical narrative ap-
proaches could help provide new ways to tackle complex questions that
explore the value–action gap; in other words, why when people report
certain values and attitudes this does not always predict their beha-
viour. Similarly, adopting such an approach allows the appreciation of
community-level narratives, which can help in understanding apparent
incongruities between the values held by social groups and the actions
of members of these groups. Whilst this essay has presented only one
adoption of the narrative metaphor, by psychology, which belies the
immensity of the ﬁeld, further research in this area could contribute to
the development of a richer understanding of the beneﬁts of adopting
narrative and dialogical approaches in the area of energy research.
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